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A GUIDE TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
by 
Frederick P. Schaffer∗ 
Introduction 
This brief introduction to the principles of academic freedom is intended for 
attorneys and other administrators who represent or work at colleges and universities.  It 
has two purposes.  The first is to introduce them to academic freedom as a set of 
professional principles regardless of whether or not they are legally enforceable.  
Attorneys and administrators need to understand the culture of the institutions they 
represent or serve.  Nowhere is this more true than with colleges and universities, which 
have well established traditions and norms that influence the expectations and conduct of 
all those responsible for their governance, including faculty, administrators and trustees.   
The second purpose is to introduce the law relating to academic freedom as it has 
evolved over the last half century.  As will become apparent, it is not always clear where 
academic freedom as a set of professional principles ends and the law begins.  Academic 
freedom has received some recognition by the Supreme Court and considerably more by 
the lower federal courts in connection with the application of the First Amendment to 
cases involving both universities as institutions and the individual rights of faculty.   
However, the meaning of academic freedom in the context of constitutional law is 
confused.  Apart from its constitutional dimension, academic freedom as a legal principle 
results from its incorporation into contracts or collective bargaining agreements between 
universities and faculty or into policies, guidelines or handbooks adopted or issued by 
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universities that may or may not create contractual rights.  It is not possible in an 
introduction to the subject of academic freedom to cover these complex issues of contract 
law and interpretation.  Rather, the goal of the present work is to present what principles 
are or are not part of the definition of academic freedom and how they may be fairly 
applied in some of the most common contexts in which they arise. 
This guide was the outgrowth of several meetings over the course of two years 
sponsored by the Ford Foundation, as part of its “Difficult Dialogues Initiative,” and with 
the active support of the National Association of College and University Attorneys.  I have 
benefitted greatly from the discussions at those meetings and from the comments of many 
of its participants on drafts of this guide.   
The Origins of Academic Freedom in the United States – The 1915 Declaration 
The principles of academic freedom in the United States were heavily influenced 
by the thinking and practice at German universities and the growth of nonsectarian 
American universities in the second half of the nineteenth century.1  With the rise of 
ideological conflicts, especially relating to economic theory, faculty began to feel the need 
for protection against trustees and/or administrators who sought the dismissal of faculty 
whose views they found unpalatable.   
In response to these conflicts, in 1915 the American Association of University 
Professors was founded and issued its Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Academic Tenure (the “Declaration”).2  The Declaration begins by stating that 
academic freedom of the teacher “comprises three elements:  freedom of inquiry and 
research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural 
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utterance and action.”  It then turns to three matters that it deems critical to understanding 
these principles.   
First, the Declaration considers the basis of academic authority, arguing that except 
for proprietary and religious institutions, colleges and universities constitute a public trust.  
This is true not only for state universities, but also for private universities because they 
appeal to the general public for contributions and moral support in the maintenance of 
non-partisan institutions of learning, not propaganda.  Accordingly, their trustees have no 
right to bind the reason or conscience of the faculty. 
Second, the Declaration considers the nature of the academic calling, arguing that 
the function of the faculty “is to deal first hand, after prolonged and specialized technical 
training, with the sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of their own and of their 
fellow-specialists’ investigations and reflection, both to students and to the general public, 
without fear or favor.”  This provides an important societal benefit by ensuring “that what 
purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall 
in fact be the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public or 
the individuals who endow or manage universities.”  This emphasis on the independence 
of faculty applies not only to their individual work as researchers and teachers, but also 
appears to have implications for the shared governance of the institution:  “A university is 
a great and indispensable organ of higher life of a civilized community, in the work of 
which the trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place, but in which the faculties 
hold an independent place, with quite equal responsibilities – and in relation to purely 
scientific and educational questions the primary responsibility.” 
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Third, the Declaration considers the functions of an academic institution, which are 
(a) to promote inquiry and advance the sum of knowledge; (b) to provide instruction to 
students; and (c) to develop experts for public service.  It argues that performance of each 
of those functions requires faculty to have complete freedom to pursue their investigations 
and discuss and publish their results and to express themselves fully and frankly both to 
their students and to the public. 
In short, the Declaration affirms that the university must provide an inviolable 
refuge from the tyranny of public opinion:  “It should be an intellectual experiment 
station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit, though still distasteful to 
the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, perchance, it may 
become a part of the accepted intellectual tool of the nation or of the world.  Not less is it a 
distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator of all genuine elements of value in 
the past thought and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of the moment.” 
Next, the Declaration counsels that the rights granted to university teachers by the 
principles of academic freedom come with corresponding obligations.  In the case of 
scholarship, this means that “the liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his 
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned on their being conclusions gained by a 
scholar’s methods and held in a scholar’s spirit; that is to say, they must be the fruits of 
competent and patient and sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity, 
courtesy, and temperateness of language.”  In the case of teaching, this means that the 
teacher “in giving instruction upon controversial matters, while under no obligation to 
hide his own opinion under a mountain of equivocal verbiage, should, if he is fit for his 
position, be a person of a fair judicial mind; he should, in dealing with such subjects, set 
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forth justly, without suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of other 
investigators; he should cause his students to become familiar with the best published 
expressions of the great historic types of doctrine upon the questions at issue; and he 
should, above all, remember that his business is not to provide his students with ready-
made conclusions, but to train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to 
those materials which they need if they are to think intelligently.”   
According to the Declaration, however, the power to determine when violations of 
those obligations have occurred should be vested in bodies composed of members of the 
academic profession.  Other bodies do not possess full competence to judge concerning 
those requirements and may be viewed as acting on the basis of motives other than zeal 
for academic integrity and the maintenance of professional standards.  At the same time, 
placing this authority exclusively in the hands of the faculty imposes a corresponding 
obligation to police the standards of their profession.  As the 1915 Declaration states:  “If 
this profession should prove itself unwilling to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the 
unworthy, or to prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of science from being 
used as a shelter for inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and intemperate 
partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by others . . . who lack . . . 
essential qualifications for performing it.” 
The Declaration goes on to apply the same principles not only to scholarship and 
teaching, but also to “extramural utterances” – that is, the expression of judgments and 
opinions outside of the classroom – and political activities, even when they pertain to 
questions falling outside the academic specialty of the faculty member.  It notes that 
“academic teachers are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or 
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exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational modes of 
expression.”  However, as with speech within the university setting, the Declaration 
counsels that the enforcement of such restraints should be, for the most part, through the 
public opinion of the profession, or, if disciplinary action is appropriate, through bodies 
composed of members of the academic profession.   
The Declaration ends its discussion of this topic with an important point that 
relates to all aspects of academic freedom:  “It is, in short, not the absolute freedom of 
utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of 
discussion and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is asserted by the declaration 
of principles.” 
The Declaration concludes with several practical proposals.  One involves the 
establishment of suitable judicial bodies relating to the dismissal or discipline of faculty 
and the determination of claims that academic freedom has been violated.  Others relate to 
procedural protections that will safeguard academic freedom, including tenure, the right to 
notice and a hearing before dismissal and the formulation of clear standards for dismissal.  
Tenure is justified as providing assurance against interference with freedom in research 
and teaching, especially against improper pressure by trustees.  However, the Declaration 
makes clear that tenure is not intended to immunize a faculty member against appropriate 
disciplinary proceedings as long as they are conducted at a hearing before the faculty or a 
committee of faculty. 
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The Reiteration of the Principles of Academic Freedom – The 1940 Statement 
In 1940, the American Association of University Professors and the 
Association of American Colleges (today the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities) agreed to a shorter version of the Declaration, now known as the 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.3  The basic purpose of 
academic freedom remained the same: 
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the 
common good and not to further the interest of either the 
individual teacher or the institution as a whole.  The 
common good depends upon the free search for truth and its 
free exposition. 
 
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies 
to both teaching and research.  Freedom in research is 
fundamental to the advancement of truth.  Academic 
freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the 
protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the 
student to freedom in learning.  It carries with it duties 
correlative with rights. 
 
The 1940 Statement, together with its 1970 Interpretive Comments, has 
been endorsed by almost 200 organizations and scholarly associations and adopted by 
many colleges and universities across the United States.  It is often incorporated into or 
referenced in faculty contracts.  Because the definition of academic freedom set forth in 
the 1940 Statement is used so widely, it is worth quoting in full: 
(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in 
the publication of the results, subject to adequate 
performance of their other academic duties; but research 
for pecuniary return should be based upon an 
understanding with the authorities of the institution. 
 
(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in 
discussing their subject, but they should be careful not to 
introduce into their teaching controversial matter which 
has no relation to their subject.  Limitations of academic 
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freedom because of religious or other aims of the 
institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time 
of the appointment. 
 
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of 
a learned profession, and officers of an educational 
institution.  When they speak or write as citizens, they 
should be free from institutional censorship or 
discipline, but their special position in the community 
imposes special obligations.  As scholars and 
educational officers, they should remember that the 
public may judge their profession and their institution by 
their utterances.  Hence they should at all times be 
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should 
show respect for the opinions of others, and should make 
every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution.   
 
The 1940 Statement goes on to deal with the subject of academic tenure.  It provides:  
“After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or investigators should have 
permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate 
cause, except . . . under extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.”  The 
reason for tenure, and its protection, is to ensure both “freedom of teaching and research 
and of extramural activities” and “a sufficient degree of economic security to make the 
profession attractive to men and women of ability.”   
Judicial Recognition of Academic Freedom 
 In the 1950’s and 1960’s the concept of academic freedom found its way into 
several opinions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with statutes barring the 
employment of faculty who had belonged to subversive organizations or who refused to 
take a loyalty oath.  Those opinions connected academic freedom to the freedom of speech 
and association protected by the First Amendment; however, neither a complete definition 
of academic freedom nor its legal basis was fully developed or firmly established. 
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In Wieman v. Updegraff4 the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that 
disqualified persons from serving as faculty members of a state university if they had 
belonged at any time to a Communist or subversive organization.  The Court ruled that the 
statute deprived state employees of due process by failing to afford them notice and an 
opportunity to demonstrate that they had joined such an organization without awareness of 
its subversive intent.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice 
Douglas, laid out the case for protecting universities as centers of independent thought and 
criticism.5 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire6 the Court reversed on narrow procedural grounds a 
contempt citation issued to a professor who had refused to appear in response to a 
subpoena issued by the state attorney general to answer detailed questions about a lecture 
he had delivered on socialism as a guest of the University of New Hampshire.  Writing for 
a four-Justice plurality, Chief Justice Warren described the following “liberties in the area 
of academic freedom” enjoyed by faculty: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should 
underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by 
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait 
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and 
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field 
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that 
new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true 
in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are 
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students 
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, 
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.7 
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter, on behalf of himself and Justice Harlan, 
focused more directly on the intellectual life of the university, quoting at length from a 
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conference report prepared by faculty, trustees and chancellors of  non-segregated South 
African universities, of which the following excerpt is best known: 
“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation.  It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four 
essential freedoms of a university – to determine for itself 
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”8 
 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents9 the Court for the first time invoked the principle 
of academic freedom in a majority opinion in a case striking down a state law subjecting 
faculty members to removal for “treasonable or seditious utterances or acts.” Quoting 
several lower court opinions, the Court wrote: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not 
merely to the teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore 
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.  “The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.”  The classroom is peculiarly the 
“marketplace of ideas.”  The Nation’s future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust 
exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude 
of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”10 
 
Through these decisions, and numerous decisions of lower courts, academic freedom was 
established as a legal principle, possibly with constitutional underpinnings, which 
protected faculty from termination based on ideological disagreement with their teaching, 
scholarship, political associations or extramural utterances. 
 Notwithstanding this development, the concept of academic freedom has fared less 
well in the courts in the ensuing decades.  The reasons for this are complex and relate to 
issues that are best considered separately and more fully.  It is sufficient to note at this 
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point the comment of one scholar that the Supreme Court “has been far more generous in 
its praise of academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its meaning.”11 
Faculty Rights and Institutional Autonomy 
 As noted above, the impetus for the 1915 Declaration was primarily to protect 
faculty from ideologically motivated attacks by trustees and administrators – that is, from 
within the university.  By contrast, the cases from the 1950’s and 1960’s tended to involve 
governmental intrusions on academic freedom.  Not surprisingly, there developed an 
emphasis on the freedom or autonomy of the university as an institution.  That emphasis 
has continued in more recent Supreme Court cases involving challenges to an action, 
practice or policy of the institution rather than the rights of an individual faculty 
member.12   
One possible exception to that trend is Regents of the University of Michigan v. 
Ewing.13  In that case the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a student’s challenge to his 
dismissal from a joint undergraduate and medical program on the ground that it violated 
his right to due process.  The decision to dismiss the student had been made after careful 
review by the faculty Promotion and Review Board and affirmed by the Executive 
Committee of the Medical School.  Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens emphasized not 
only the Court’s “reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational 
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom,”14 but specifically 
the role of the faculty: 
The record unmistakably demonstrates, however, that the 
faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with careful 
deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of 
Ewing's academic career. When judges are asked to review 
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this 
one, they should show great respect for the faculty's 
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professional judgment.  [FN 11]  Plainly, they may not 
override it unless it is such a substantial departure from 
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person 
or committee responsible did not actually exercise 
professional judgment. 
 
*          *          *  
 
FN 11.  “University faculties must have the widest range of 
discretion in making judgments as to the academic 
performance of students and their entitlement to promotion 
or graduation.”  (Citations omitted)15   
In sum, the Supreme Court has at various times recognized that both strands – the 
institutional autonomy of universities and the rights of faculty – are part of academic 
freedom.16  However, in none of these cases did the result turn on which strand of 
academic freedom was emphasized because in all of them the interests of the faculty and 
the institution were aligned to repel a common external threat.17  Some lower courts have 
recognized that the First Amendment protects the academic freedom of individual faculty 
members,18 while others have held that it protects only institutional autonomy. 19  (Legal 
scholars are similarly divided on the issue.20)  Whether focusing on the faculty or the 
institution, however, lower courts have tended to give great deference to any decision 
concerning a matter of academic judgment, including not only judgments regarding 
students but also the tenure or promotion of faculty.21   
   What does not appear from reading the court decisions applying the principles of 
academic freedom to First Amendment claims is the important role of grievance 
procedures established by both university governance and collective bargaining in 
developing and protecting the principles of academic freedom.  In such proceedings, 
faculty regularly assert their individual rights to academic freedom and, where 
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appropriate, prevail in cases involving intrusions not only from outside the university, but 
also within the university.22  
Although the right of the faculty to free inquiry and the autonomy of the university 
are both critical to the meaning of academic freedom, they do not always mean the same 
thing or point in the same direction.  As the Supreme Court noted in Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Ewing:  “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent 
and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat 
inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the academy itself.”23   The Supreme 
Court has provided no guidance as to what should happen when a faculty plaintiff invokes 
academic freedom as insulation against an adverse institutional decision while in the same 
case the institution invokes its academic freedom to be free from control, and lower court 
decisions are often inconsistent and unhelpful.24  However, as a general matter, the correct 
approach should be apparent from the core principles of the doctrine of academic freedom: 
faculty members should be protected in their freedom to teach and conduct and publish 
scholarly research, subject only to academic judgment of their peers.25  Where the adverse 
decision complained of is the result of such a judgment, expressed through the ordinary 
procedures of university governance, it is not a violation of academic freedom, and courts 
should refrain from intervening.26   
This conclusion flows from the fact that although academic freedom provides 
faculty with individual rights, they are far from absolute.  Even the core principles of 
academic freedom in research and teaching are subject to the judgment of other faculty.27  
It is the faculty collectively who decide on what constitutes original and valuable 
scholarship sufficient for promotion or tenure, what courses should be taught, what 
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syllabus should be followed and what readings should be assigned, and even what grades 
should be awarded to students.28  Individual faculty members have the right to participate 
in these decisions; and as a practical matter their recommendations are often followed 
although academic administrators, up to and including the president, generally have the 
final word.  Nevertheless, the key point is that academic decisions are to be made by the 
academy as a body, not by any single individual.  In short, all faculty members are subject 
to the judgment of their peers.   
This principle, which is fundamental to the reasoning of both the 1915 Declaration 
and the 1940 Statement, may be criticized as hopelessly naïve, based as it is on the 
widespread belief of the Progressive Era that there existed such a thing as expertise, and 
that properly trained experts could be relied on to make fair and unbiased judgments that 
would lead to an objective truth.  In the current era of Post-Modernism, that belief, at least 
outside the natural sciences, has been aggressively challenged.  Academic politics may 
produce results based as much on ideology and intellectual fashion as any other sort of 
politics.  However, if a space is to be preserved for the intellectual freedom necessary for 
critical inquiry, the final decision must generally rest with persons who share the training 
and traditions of the academy.  The occasional errors and injustices thereby produced are a 
necessary price for that freedom.  Otherwise, the decisions will be made by others who 
have their own biases but share neither the intellectual training and discipline of academic 
discourse nor the tradition of free inquiry.29 
This is not to say that there is never any recourse from decisions made by faculty 
bodies or administrators on issues involving scholarship or teaching.  Decisions relating to 
appointments, tenure and promotion are subject to laws prohibiting discrimination just like 
 14 
14
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 13 [2018], Art. 18
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss13/18
employment decisions in other contexts.  Furthermore, where there is evidence that a 
decision was made on the basis of factors extraneous to the proper exercise of academic 
judgment, it does not violate the principles of academic freedom for such a decision to be 
reviewed, whether through the internal procedures of the university itself, or if such 
procedures do not exist, by the courts.  However, the standard for review should be 
demanding.  It should generally involve deference to the decision of the faculty unless 
there is clear evidence that the decision was not the result of academic judgment, bearing 
in mind that such judgment may appropriately include preferences for scholarly 
approaches or methodologies (as opposed to particular views or conclusions).  
Another question concerning the two strands of academic freedom is whether the 
concept of institutional autonomy is necessarily derivative of the faculty’s freedom of 
inquiry or whether universities have a zone of freedom from outside interference that 
belongs to them as institutions without reference to the role of the faculty.  In the view of 
this author, the two strands of academic freedom are inextricably connected and both are 
essential.  Institutional autonomy is justified because universities provide the collective 
setting in which scholars subject the work of their peers to review based on their expertise.  
Within that context, the advancement of the academic enterprise requires individual 
faculty to be free to pursue the truth in their scholarship and teaching without adverse 
consequences unrelated to the quality of their work.  Thus, academic freedom can serve 
the public good only if universities as institutions are free from outside pressures in the 
realm of their academic mission and individual faculty members are free to pursue their 
research and teaching subject only to the academic judgment of their peers. 
 15 
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Nevertheless, it is worth considering two contexts in which the institutional 
autonomy of the university may appear unrelated to the rights of faculty.  One such 
context is student admissions.  As noted above, Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring 
opinion in Sweeny, included the decision as to “who shall be admitted to study” as one of 
the “four essential freedoms of a university.”  That view was echoed by Justice Powell in 
his concurring opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke30and Justice 
O’Connor in the opinion of the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger31 upholding the affirmative 
action plan adopted by the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School.  Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion explicitly states that the Court’s conclusion that the  racial diversity 
of the student body is a compelling state interest rests on the Court’s deference to the 
“Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational 
mission”; such deference, the opinion continues, is consistent with its traditional 
recognition that “given the important purpose of public education and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”32   
However, the idea that admissions standards or policies are among the principles 
of academic freedom does not appear in either the 1915 Declaration or the 1940 
Statement.  Moreover, although the establishment and implementation of standards and 
policies concerning admissions may once have been a faculty prerogative, they are now 
often the responsibility of administrators and boards of trustees, at least at the 
undergraduate level.  Thus, this is an area where the institutional autonomy of the 
university may be somewhat separate from the role of the faculty.  However, it should be 
noted that the autonomy of a university over admissions has received only weak 
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recognition.  The Court in Grutter (by a bare majority) was willing to give weight to the 
academic decision of the University of Michigan Law School (and other educational 
institutions that filed briefs as amicus curiae) to the effect that racial diversity furthered 
the educational goals of such institutions.  Nevertheless, it is doubtful that it would violate 
academic freedom (as opposed to some other value or principle) if a board of regents, a 
state legislature or the voters in a referendum impose a different set of admissions 
standards or policies upon a public university or professional school.33  Policies relating to 
admissions, especially in the area of affirmative action, involve less academic expertise 
and more of the kind of public policy choices usually decided by democratic means than 
such issues as the evaluation of scholarship or the proper content of the curriculum.34 
A second context in which institutional autonomy has recently been asserted 
involves the gathering of evidence from universities by government investigators or 
private parties in connection with litigation. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC35 the 
Supreme Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not violate 
academic freedom in requiring a university to turn over confidential peer-review materials 
pursuant to a subpoena issued in its investigation of a Title VII claim filed by a faculty 
member who had been denied tenure. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun 
distinguished earlier academic freedom cases that involved “direct” infringement 
regarding the content of academic speech or the right to determine who may teach.36   By 
contrast, Justice Blackmun found that  the burden imposed by the subpoena on the 
university’s ability to determine who may teach was at most indirect since the EEOC was 
not seeking to impose mandatory criteria on the university in selecting faculty.37  One 
commentator has conjectured that “perhaps because the party invoking academic freedom 
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was a university, the Court made no mention, even obliquely, to the interests a faculty 
member might have in engaging in peer review without external coercion.”38  However, 
the Supreme Court clearly understood the claim that the confidentiality of the peer review 
process was important to the process of evaluating faculty even though the party invoking 
that claim was the university.  It simply disagreed that this claim was sufficiently strong to 
overcome the government interest in obtaining relevant evidence in the investigation of a 
discrimination complaint.39   
That balance tends to shift when the government or private parties seek to use 
compulsory process to obtain the research or teaching materials of faculty.  Where faculty 
members are expert witnesses, they are, of course, subject to the same scope of discovery 
as other similarly situated persons.  Thus, for example, the publisher of a book by an 
expert witness may be compelled to produce the peer reviews obtained before publication, 
but an expert witness may not be required to turn over the draft of a book on which she is 
working.40   
When a faculty member is not serving as an expert witness, subpoenas for the 
research or teaching materials may require an especially strong justification where they 
impinge on First Amendment rights that faculty share with all citizens.41  Some courts 
have shown particular concern for academic freedom in this context.42  Indeed, in one 
case, the court provided to research scholars the same protection from discovery that it had 
previously afforded journalists insofar as the confidentiality of sources was implicated.43  
In addition to the need for confidentiality, it might also be argued in this context that the 
academic freedom of scholars includes their right to decide when, where and how to 
present their research findings.  Their research should not be commandeered into the 
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service of others in cases or controversies in which they are not serving as expert 
witnesses.44   
A similar argument could be made in favor of protecting faculty materials and 
communications concerning their research or teaching against disclosure under open 
records or freedom of information laws applicable to public universities.45  However, state 
courts have consistently rejected the argument for an academic freedom privilege or 
exemption in this context, although some state laws provide varying degrees of 
protection.46   
Such protection should be afforded whether the subpoenas or requests are issued to 
individual faculty members or to their universities or research institutes.  The degree of 
and rationale for protection are the same in either case.  Thus, in this area, as in almost 
every other, the individual’s freedom of inquiry and the university’s autonomy are two 
aspects of the same principle of academic freedom. 
Academic Freedom and Free Speech 
Of the three elements of academic freedom, the freedom of “extramural utterance 
and action” is surely the most problematic.  Unlike freedom in research and teaching, it 
has no special connection to the university and no justification based on the special 
expertise of faculty members to judge the quality of the work of their peers based on 
academic standards.  Indeed, both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 Statement refer to 
the right of faculty to speak as citizens.47  However, we do not ordinarily think of the right 
of citizens to speak and associate freely as a function of their professional or occupational 
status.  Accordingly, in most contexts, the freedom of faculty “to speak publicly on 
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matters of public concern reflects the permeation of the campus by general civil rights 
rather than an elaboration of a right unique to the university.”48    
This development has been a mixed blessing.  The First Amendment limits the 
power only of government.  Thus, private colleges and universities are not restrained by 
its terms, and their faculty members are not thereby protected.49  Furthermore, the status 
of faculty at public universities subjects them to the narrower scope of free speech 
afforded to public employees generally.  First, the protection afforded to a public 
employee’s free speech depends on the application of a balancing test between the 
employee’s interest in the expression and the interest of the employer in promoting 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.50  Second, the First 
Amendment protects the speech of a public employee only when he is speaking as a 
private citizen on a matter of public concern and not merely a matter of personal interest.51  
It is therefore doubtful under this test that constitutional protection exists for many aspects 
of faculty speech relating to internal university matters.52  Finally, as the Supreme Court 
held in Garcetti v. Ceballos, public employees enjoy no freedom of speech when their 
speech or expression is made “pursuant to their official duties.”53 
In Garcetti the Supreme Court rejected the free speech claim of a prosecutor who 
had been fired allegedly in retaliation for his testimony on behalf of a criminal defendant 
to the effect that a sheriff’s deputy obtained a search warrant by means of a false affidavit.  
The Court held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”54  Since 
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the parties stipulated that the speech in question was made pursuant to the employee’s 
duties, the Court dismissed the complaint.   
The Garcetti case presented a context that was quite different from a public 
university, and the Court acknowledged that difference.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Souter expressed a concern that the decision might “imperil First Amendment protection 
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak 
and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”55  In response, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Justice Souter suggests today’s decision may have important 
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a 
constitutional value.  There is some argument that 
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that 
are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence.  We need not, and for that 
reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today 
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech 
related to scholarship or teaching.56 
The Supreme Court provided some clarification to the meaning of Garcetti in Lane 
v. Franks.57  Lane was the former director of a community college’s program for 
underprivileged youth, who fired Schmitz, a counselor, who was also a state 
representative, for failing to show up for work.  This lead to a federal investigation and 
indictment of Schmitz.  Lane testified about his reasons for firing Schmitz before a federal 
grand jury and, pursuant to subpoena, at both criminal trials; the second trial resulted in a 
conviction.  Not long thereafter, during a period of financial difficulties, the college laid 
Lane off.  He sued alleging retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment right to free 
speech.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Lane’s speech was made pursuant to his 
official duties as a public employee and was therefore not protected by the First 
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Amendment under Garcetti.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]ruthful 
testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is 
speech as a citizen for First amendment purposes.”58  The Court distinguished Garcetti  on 
the ground that the memorandum at issue in that case was commissioned by the employer, 
and was therefore made pursuant to his official responsibilities whereas Lane’s testimony 
was compelled by subpoena and was therefore speech as a citizen, not part of his official 
responsibilities.  As the Court reasoned, “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns 
information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech 
into employee . . .  speech.”59  Thus, the Court concluded that “[t]he critical question 
under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an 
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”60  
The lower courts have wrestled with the application of Garcetti to free speech 
claims of faculty members in public universities.61  First, there is the question of when are 
faculty members speaking pursuant to their official duties.  Most courts have interpreted 
this concept broadly, including speech related not only to activities that may be specified 
in a written job description or faculty handbook, but also to pretty much everything that 
faculty traditionally do within the university setting, at least where the speech was directed 
to others within that setting.62  By contrast, speech by faculty members directed to 
audiences outside of the university, such as letters to the editor of a newspaper, articles for 
popular magazines or speeches in non-academic settings, have not been viewed as within 
their official duties.63  
Second, there is the question of what significance should be given to Justice 
Kennedy’s caveat and whether to carve out an exception from the Garcetti analysis for 
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speech relating to scholarship or teaching.  Some courts appear to have ignored the issue 
of academic freedom but did so in cases that did not involve speech relating to scholarship 
or teaching.64  Others have explicitly held that speech relating to scholarship or teaching is 
protected by the First Amendment.65  So far only a few courts have addressed the meaning 
of “speech relating to scholarship or teaching”.  In one case, the court interpreted that 
category rather narrowly, holding that a librarian’s recommendation of a book for 
freshman reading in connection with orientation is not speech relating to teaching.66  More 
recently, the Ninth Circuit held that a professor’s plan concerning the faculty structure of a 
school of communications, written while he served on a committee that was debating 
some of the issues addressed by his plan, constituted speech related to scholarship or 
teaching because it was a proposal to implement a change “that, if implemented, could 
have substantially altered the nature of what was taught at the school, as well as the 
composition of the faculty that would teach it.”67    
This broader definition of speech relating to scholarship or teaching seems 
appropriate.  If academic freedom is to be adequately protected, it would seem at a 
minimum that the covered category of speech should include not only what is written in 
scholarly articles and spoken in the classroom, but also statements made in connection 
with such activities as the evaluation of the scholarship of others, the establishment of 
curricula and academic standards and structures and the academic advising of students.  
More generally, courts need to recognize that faculty participate in the governance of 
institutions of higher education in ways that are fundamentally different from other public 
agencies.  Unlike other public employees, faculty are expected to exercise independent 
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thought and judgment on university governance rather than carry out the mandate of their 
agency head. 68   
Finally, courts will need to continue to refine the application of the balancing test 
to a university context.  This involves primarily the determination of what constitutes a 
matter of public concern as opposed to a matter of merely personal interest.69  Not 
everything a teacher might say deserves the protection of the principles of academic 
freedom. 70  This includes speech in a classroom that does not relate to the subject matter 
of the class and is profane, sexual or otherwise objectionable.71  It also includes speech on 
issues of internal organization, performance or personnel matters that are not of public 
concern.72  However, one court has held that speech on an issue of academic organization 
may have wider implications about the future course of a public university and therefore 
may constitute a matter of public concern.73  Similarly, another court has held that the 
letter by an adjunct faculty member, written in her capacity as the head of a union and on 
behalf of its members, which deplored the treatment of part-time faculty and her college’s 
over-reliance on them to the detriment of the students, involved a matter of public 
concern.74  
However the courts eventually resolve these First Amendment questions 
concerning faculty speech at public universities, academic freedom is a concept 
independent of constitutional law.  The question therefore arises whether the principles of 
academic freedom should establish norms within universities that are more protective of 
extramural speech than the First Amendment, even if they cannot be enforced by courts.  
At both private and public institutions of higher education, academic freedom should 
continue to protect speech in which faculty speak as citizens on matters of public concern.  
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Although not directly related to the primary rationale for academic freedom, such freedom 
of expression is part of a long and valued tradition of universities as places committed to 
wide-ranging debate on such matters.75  There is no good reason why any faculty, whether 
at private or public universities, should be subject to reprisals because colleagues, 
administrators, alumni or politicians take umbrage at the expression of views on subjects 
of public concern.76  Moreover, the boundaries of what constitutes matters of public 
concern should be interpreted broadly.  At least some matters pertaining to university 
issues, such as presidential pay, conflicts of interest by trustees and significant change in 
general education requirements or academic standards, are of real and legitimate interest 
to the larger community. 
In addition, if the Supreme Court does not eventually recognize the need for 
expanded protection for speech relating to scholarship or teaching, or interprets those 
categories narrowly, or does not also include speech relating to academic governance as 
deserving of similar protection, a strong argument can be made for continuing to protect 
such speech under the umbrella of academic freedom as applied within the setting of the 
university itself.   
Some would argue further that academic freedom should also protect speech 
unrelated to matters of public concern or to scholarship, teaching or academic 
governance.77  However, it is far from clear why such speech has value to the academic 
enterprise and should be protected by principles of academic freedom.  Moreover, the 
recognition and enforcement of such a broad concept of academic freedom within 
universities would inevitably give rise to endless disputes and grievances as faculty claim 
retaliation for every adverse action.  Internal procedures already exist at most universities 
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to review decisions relating to reappointment, promotion and tenure on the ground that 
they were based on extraneous factors and not on the quality of scholarship, teaching and 
service.  That seems not only appropriate but consistent with principles of academic 
freedom, which are premised upon the integrity of a system of academic judgment and 
peer review.  However,  academic freedom is in no way advanced by requiring the review 
of a morass of petty retaliation claims arising in contexts where there does not exist formal 
review procedures, such as departmental disagreements as to course content, class 
schedules or the selection of department chairs,78 and where there is no connection to the 
core values of scholarship or teaching.79   
 
Academic Freedom and University Governance 
The 1915 Declaration is explicit that academic freedom requires the faculty to play 
the central role in making academic judgments about scholarship and teaching and  in 
disciplining faculty for failure to meet appropriate standards.  The 1940 Statement is silent 
on issues of governance.  However, in 1966 the AAUP adopted a Statement on 
Government of Colleges and Universities (the “Statement on Government”), which it had 
jointly formulated with the American Council on Education and the Association of 
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges.80  The Statement on Government 
emphasizes the need for shared responsibility by boards, faculties and administrators.  It 
notes that the role of each group and the form of their cooperation will vary depending on 
the area in question.  Like the 1915 Declaration, it gives the faculty primary responsibility 
for academic matters based on their expertise and goes on to define those matters as 
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“curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those 
aspects of student life that relate to the educational process.”   
In 1998 the Association of Governing Boards issued its own Statement on 
Institutional Governance.81  The AGB Statement notes “a widespread perception that 
faculty members, especially in research universities, are divided in their loyalties between 
their academic disciplines and the welfare of their own institutions” and the belief of many 
governing boards, faculty and chief executives that “internal governance arrangements 
have become so cumbersome that timely decisions are difficult to make, and small 
factions often are able to impede the decision-making process.”  While acknowledging the 
important role of faculty regarding academic matters, the AGB Statement emphasizes “the 
ultimate responsibility” of governing boards, the role of other constituencies, such as 
students, non-faculty staff and external stakeholders and the need for the fiscal and 
managerial affairs of universities to be “administered with appropriate attention to 
commonly accepted business standards.”  The variations between the AAUP Statement 
and the AGB Statement reflect not only the different perspectives of the associations that 
issued them, but also the differing practices of the many universities and colleges within 
the United States.  Nevertheless, as a matter of practice it is fair to say that faculty 
generally have strong but not dispositive authority over such critical academic matters as 
curriculum and appointments.82 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of university governance in two vastly 
different contexts.  In NLRB v. Yeshiva University83 it held that the faculty members of 
that institution did not have the right to organize under the National Labor Relations Act 
because they were “managerial employees.”  The Court contrasted the “shared authority” 
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of Yeshiva University, which had a fairly typical governance structure, with the 
“pyramidal hierarchies of private industry.”84  Indeed, the Court went on to recognize the 
value of such shared authority by noting “[t]he university requires faculty participation in 
governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and 
implementation of academic policy.”85 Notwithstanding its recognition of the policy 
arguments in favor of such shared authority, in Minnesota State Board for Community 
Colleges v. Knight86 the Supreme Court held that faculty have no First Amendment right 
to participate in academic governance at a public institution of higher education.87 
Where does this leave the idea of shared governance as a component of academic 
freedom?  It seems clear that a substantial faculty role in the academic governance of the 
university is a sine qua non for academic freedom even if it is not a matter of 
constitutional right and may not be subject to judicial enforcement.88  However, there will 
continue to be considerable disagreement as to the exact contours of that role.  The AAUP 
Statement on Government maintains that the president and the board should overrule the 
faculty “only in exceptional circumstances, and for reasons communicated to the faculty” 
and goes on to identify financial constraints or personnel limitations as the kinds of factors 
that might justify the rejection of a faculty recommendation.89  Nevertheless, many 
university presidents are members of the faculty and have deep experience in exercising 
academic judgment.  Moreover, even if one were to agree that presidents should generally 
defer to the faculty on academic matters (and boards even more so), it seems entirely 
appropriate for them to review faculty decisions where there is evidence that they may not 
have rested on academic judgment.90 
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Tenure and Other Procedural Safeguards 
 Tenure has been considered an essential component of academic freedom in the 
United States from the outset.  It is based on the reasonable assumption that established 
scholars and teachers will feel and exercise greater independence of thought if they can be 
dismissed only for weighty reasons and with considerable difficulty.91  There are, of 
course, policy arguments that can be made against tenure because it removes some 
incentives for greater scholarly effort and protects senior faculty who have ceased to be 
productive.  It may be countered that tenured faculty remain motivated by their need for 
self-esteem and the recognition of their peers and that, in any event, any loss in 
productivity is outweighed by the gain in intellectual independence.  Whatever the merits 
of the debate, tenure or the possibility of tenure remains a fact of life for a substantial 
portion of faculty positions at institutions of higher education.  However, in an era of 
increasing fiscal constraints and oversupply of candidates, most faculty in the United 
States today are no longer in tenure-track positions, including a large number who work 
for long periods on a part-time basis.92      
 Tenure was never intended to guarantee unconditional or lifetime job security to 
faculty.  The 1915 Declaration recognizes that tenured faculty may be dismissed.  As 
noted above, it does not attempt to set forth the legitimate grounds for such dismissal, but 
rather directs each institution to establish them “with reasonable definiteness.”  The 1915 
Declaration goes on to recommend certain procedural safeguards in cases of dismissal 
applicable to both tenured and untenured faculty.  It provides that in cases not involving 
academic judgment (such as “habitual neglect of assigned duties”), lay boards may decide 
whether there is cause for dismissal, but that in cases involving the utterance of opinion or 
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an issue of professional competence, only a body composed of faculty should be permitted 
to decide.93  Furthermore, the 1915 Declaration provides that prior to dismissal or 
demotion, a faculty member should receive a specific, written statement of charges and be 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which he can present evidence, including reports from 
other teachers and scholars if the charges involve incompetence.94  The 1940 Statement 
has similar provisions.95  In both documents, these procedures are applicable only to the 
dismissal for cause of full-time faculty who are tenured or, if untenured, before the 
expiration of the term of their appointment.  
 Most universities provide these procedural safeguards in connection with 
proceedings to dismiss full-time faculty, whether or not they have received tenure.  In 
addition, full-time faculty at public institutions enjoy the protection of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To determine what process is constitutionally due, 
the Supreme Court generally balances three factors:  “First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest.”96     
  With respect to the first factor, the right to due process arises only when a person is 
deprived of a liberty or property interest.  A liberty interest includes a person’s reputation 
or standing in the community. Thus, the right to due process would be triggered if there 
are charges that might seriously damage such interests.97  A property interest arises when 
an individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.   Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
held that public college faculty dismissed from a tenured position or during the terms of 
their contracts have interests in continued employment that are safeguarded by due 
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process.98  By contrast, professors who are not reappointed after the expiration of the term 
of their appointment have not been deprived of any property interest and are not entitled to 
a statement of reasons or a hearing.99  In a similar vein the Supreme Court has suggested, 
and several lower courts have held, that suspension of a faculty member with pay does not 
constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property interest and therefore does not implicate 
due process concerns.100 
 In cases where “it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 
what process is due.”101  This question is well settled as a matter of constitutional law 
(although many universities provide somewhat greater protection).  In general, public 
employees who may be dismissed only for cause are entitled to a very limited hearing 
prior to their termination, to be followed by a more comprehensive post-termination 
hearing; the pre-termination process need only include oral or written notice of the 
charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee 
to tell his or her side of the story.102  Moreover, there are circumstances, such as where an 
employee has been charged with a serious crime, where an employee may be suspended 
without pay without any hearing at all, especially where he occupies a position of great 
public trust and high public visibility or the suspension is necessary to maintain public 
confidence.103   
 Since the 1940 Statement the AAUP has issued several policy documents relating 
to the dismissal of faculty as well as the renewal or nonrenewal of faculty appointment.  
These include the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal 
Proceedings, the Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure and the Statement of Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of 
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Faculty Appointments.104  Although some of their provisions resemble those in collective 
bargaining agreements and internal administrative procedures at many universities, these 
policy documents have not been widely endorsed or adopted by other organizations.  
Some universities have adapted portions of these policies, while others have rejected them 
entirely.  Accordingly, they should be viewed as no more than recommendations by an 
association representing the interests of faculty.105  
 An issue closely related to procedural safeguards is the standard of conduct by 
which faculty members should be judged in connection with dismissal.  As noted above, 
the 1915 Declaration recommended only that such standards be stated with definiteness 
and left the substance to each university to determine.  Not surprisingly, there are 
considerable differences among universities.  In its Recommended Institutional 
Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the AAUP requires “adequate cause” for 
dismissal to be “related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of faculty members in 
their professional capacities as teachers or researchers.”106  Few universities have adopted 
the AAUP standard.  Its definition of adequate cause is too narrow to take into account the 
full range of legitimate institutional interests of universities.  For example, it is doubtful 
that under the AAUP standard, a faculty member could be dismissed for conduct 
unbecoming a member of the profession or even the commission of a crime (at least as 
long as the victims were not other faculty members or students and the crime was not 
committed on campus).  However, in that connection, universities are entitled to consider 
their interests in maintaining public confidence, attracting and retaining student 
applications and enrollment and providing role models for students.   
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Similarly, the AAUP’s 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty 
Dismissal Proceedings provides that in connection with proceedings to terminate a faculty 
member, suspension “is justified only if immediate harm to the faculty member or others 
is threatened by the faculty member’s continuance.”107  Most universities have regulations 
or collective bargaining agreements that are not so restrictive and that permit suspension 
in other circumstances, including when a faculty member has been charged with or 
convicted of a serious crime, when the faculty member’s continued presence would 
interfere with the operations of the university or when in the president’s judgment 
suspension is otherwise necessary in the best interests of the university. 
Academic Freedom and the Rights of Students 
 The principles of academic freedom do not apply to students as they do to faculty.  
As discussed above, academic freedom serves to promote the public good by protecting 
the intellectual independence of faculty in their scholarship and teaching, subject to the 
professional judgment of their peers.  Within the academic community, students are 
novices, under the intellectual tutelage of the faculty.  Their freedom of speech is not 
properly understood as part of academic freedom because it has nothing to do with “the 
preservation of the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of 
disinterested scholarship and teaching.”108  That is not to say, however, that students do 
not have any rights relating to the free expression of their views and opinions.  Students at 
public universities are protected by the First Amendment against restrictions on their 
rights of free speech and association.109  Indeed, in light of the limitations on the First 
Amendment rights of public employees discussed above, it may be that students at public 
universities have greater rights to free speech than faculty.   
 33 
33
Schaffer: Academic Freedom in Trying Times (CLE)
Published by The Keep, 2018
One of the most contentious areas of controversy concerning the First Amendment 
rights of university students relates to “speech codes,” which have consistently been found 
unconstitutional.110  Another area relates to the use of student activity fees.  In Southworth 
v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin111 the Supreme Court upheld the use of 
mandatory student activity fees to fund student advocacy having educational benefit 
against a claim that such a fee violates the First Amendment interest of students not to 
have their money used to promote ideas with which they disagree.  The Court reasoned 
that the university’s educational interest in promoting speech by its students outweighed 
the students’ interest as long as the university followed a strict policy of “viewpoint 
neutrality” in the allocation of the funds collected from the mandatory fee.112 
 As noted above in discussing the faculty’s freedom of expression in extramural 
utterances, the university has come to serve an important function as a marketplace of 
ideas outside the realms of scholarship and systematic learning.  It may be analytically 
correct to view this function as falling outside the protection of academic freedom.  
Nevertheless, it is a tradition worth protecting and preserving as long as it does not 
conflict with the core purposes of the university.  Accordingly, students should enjoy 
rights to free speech and association whether or not they attend a public university and 
thus enjoy First Amendment protection.  Both in the larger university setting and within 
the classroom, students should be free to express their views, and they should not be 
subject to reprisals because of their opinions.113 
This freedom of expression by students, however, is subject to two limitations.  
First, it may not interfere with the other activities of the campus or classroom.  This 
common sense limitation is an accepted part of First Amendment jurisprudence and serves 
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as the justification for reasonable limitations on the time, place and manner of protests and 
other expressive activities both on and off university campuses.114  
Second, student speech and writing in the classroom context is subject to the 
academic authority of their teachers to evaluate their course work with respect to factual 
accuracy, authority of sources, research methodology, organization, quality of expression, 
analytical rigor and other legitimate academic factors.  The Supreme Court has supported 
this limitation not only in Southworth but also in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.115  In that case the Court upheld a high school principal’s right to delete two 
pages from a newspaper produced by students in connection with a journalism class.  The 
Court held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”116  Of course, precedents from the K-12 context are not necessarily applicable 
to higher education, where the greater age and maturity of students and the stronger 
tradition of free inquiry militate in favor of greater student rights.  Nevertheless, it remains 
true that in both contexts students’ right to free speech in the classroom setting is subject 
to the legitimate academic standards and concerns of the faculty and the institution.117   
The authority of faculty, indeed their academic freedom, also extends to the design 
of curricula and the presentation of materials.  This is not primarily a question of their 
individual rights as teachers but rather their collective authority as part of the academic 
governance of the institution.  The purpose of teaching is not merely to impart knowledge, 
but to train students to think for themselves.  The recent statement on Academic Freedom 
and Educational Responsibility by the Association of American Colleges and Universities 
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puts it well:  “Students do not have a right to remain free from encountering unwelcome or 
‘inconvenient questions.’”118  At the same time, however, and as the 1915 Declaration 
recognizes, faculty are expected to conform to professional norms with regard to avoiding 
controversial topics unrelated to the subject matter of a course and presenting relevant 
controversial materials in an academically thoughtful and rigorous way.119 
Most of the litigated cases in this area pertain not to controversial subject matters 
or views but to the use of language by faculty that is profane or sexual.   In several pre-
Garcetti cases, the courts seem to have grasped the key principle here.  On the one hand, 
courts have dismissed claims by faculty that their rights to free speech or academic 
freedom were violated because they were terminated for profane or sexual speech that was 
unrelated to the subject matter of the class and that served no valid educational purpose.120  
On the other hand, courts have reversed a university’s discipline of a faculty member 
where they found that language, although objectionable to some, advanced his valid 
educational objectives related to the subject matter of his course.121  Nevertheless, these 
cases are troubling to the extent that courts in some of them reviewed and in one case 
reversed the decision of a faculty committee as to what was appropriate, thereby intruding 
upon the university’s autonomy in an area of academic judgment.122 
As with many cases involving student speech, these cases often arise in the context 
of a university’s enforcement of a policy against sexual harassment.  Two courts have 
struck down such a policy because its language was unconstitutionally vague and 
therefore violated a faculty member’s First Amendment rights.123  A properly drafted 
sexual harassment policy should survive such a challenge but must, of course, be 
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interpreted and applied in manner that respects the right of free speech.  As the Office of 
Civil Rights has recently reiterated:: 
. . .  the laws and regulations it enforces protect students from prohibited 
discrimination and do not restrict the exercise of any expressive activities 
or speech protected under the U.S. Constitution.  Therefore, when a school 
works to prevent and redress discrimination, it must respect the free-
speech rights of students, faculty, and other speakers.   
Title IX protects students from sex discrimination; it does not regulate the 
content of speech.  OCR recognizes that the offensiveness of a particular 
expression as perceived by some students, standing along, is not a legally 
sufficient basis to establish a hostile environment under Title IX.  Title IX 
also does not require, prohibit, or abridge the use of particular textbooks or 
curricular materials.124 
However, where a professor’s speech is reasonably regarded as offensive, is not germane 
to the subject matter of the course and is sufficiently severe and pervasive as to impair a 
student’s academic opportunity, there is no reason why anti-discrimination laws cannot be 
applied without violating faculty rights to free speech or academic freedom.125 
Another area of contention relates to the introduction of religious texts or subjects.  
Where this has been done as part of an academic exercise and not to advance a particular 
religious view, the courts have upheld the university’s actions against claims that they 
violated the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.126  
Conversely, one court has upheld limitations on a faculty member’s speech about his 
religious views within a classroom that appeared unrelated to the subject matter of the 
course.127 
  In sum, it is inconsistent with principles of academic freedom for faculty to have to 
censor their speech within the classroom because of student objections where such speech 
is related to the subject of the course.  If their speech is not so related and is offensive to a 
reasonable person, faculty may be appropriately restrained or disciplined.  In either case, it 
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is helpful in dealing with these types of controversies for universities to have internal 
procedures to review complaints by students concerning faculty behavior in classrooms.  
Such procedures should involve faculty in the review of student complaints and should 
provide explicit protection for the principles of academic freedom.128 
Uses and Abuses of Academic Freedom 
In the century since the AAUP issued the 1915 Declaration, the principles of 
academic freedom have gained greater acceptance than its originators could have 
imagined.  There is hardly a university that does not at least profess its commitment to 
academic freedom, although conformance to its principles, as always, tends to ebb and 
flow with the phases of the political moon.  Indeed, so widespread is the acceptance of 
academic freedom that some use it to advance claims or proposals that have little or no 
connection to its principles – or in fact are inconsistent with them.  Some such claims 
border on the silly.129  However, two examples, from opposite ends of the spectrum, are 
worth considering in more detail. 
In his Academic Bill of Rights,130 David Horowitz proposes principles to address 
what he claims is a lack of intellectual and political diversity among university faculty and 
a resulting tendency of faculty to use the classroom for indoctrination.131  Several of those 
principles consist of restatements of the traditional view of academic freedom.  These 
include the principles that (i) faculty should be evaluated based on their competence and 
knowledge in their field of expertise; (ii) students should be graded on the basis of their 
reasoned answers and appropriate knowledge of the subjects and disciplines they study; 
and (iii) neither faculty nor students should be judged on the basis of their political or 
religious beliefs.   
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Others are consistent with the principles of academic freedom, but create pressures 
against the exercise of intellectual independence or originality.  For example, it is a valid 
objective that curricula, reading lists and classroom teaching should expose students to a 
range of significant scholarly opinion.  However, it is not a simple matter to determine 
precisely what that should include in order to protect faculty from charges of 
“indoctrination” from their students or outside groups.  As several scholars have 
commented, the Academic Bill of Rights threatens to “snuff out all controversial 
discussion in the classroom” by presenting faculty “with an impossible dilemma: either 
play it safe or risk administrative censure by saying something that might offend an overly 
sensitive student.”132   
Moreover, the Academic Bill of Rights seeks to implement its goal of neutrality in 
teaching by requiring universities to recruit faculty "with a view toward fostering a 
plurality of methodologies and perspectives," thereby creating a risk that faculty will be 
hired based on their political beliefs, notwithstanding the Bill’s own prohibition on 
precisely such behavior.  This risk is exacerbated by modern telecommunications 
technology.  In the past, most scholarship was published in academic journals and books 
that were not widely available, and criticism (generally from scholars) appeared in similar 
venues.  Now, however, almost everything that faculty write is available on line, and 
commentary by both other scholars and the public (including highly ideological segments 
of the public) is distributed widely through social media, blogs and other electronic 
outlets.  Although such commentary, even when vitriolic and unfair, is not itself a 
violation of academic freedom, its widespread availability, including occasional 
appearances on mainstream media, may well serve to intimidate some faculty.   
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Finally, by seeking (so far unsuccessfully) the enactment of laws similar to the 
Academic Bill of Rights by Congress and several state legislatures, its supporters invite 
the kind of outside interference, from both legislatures and courts, that is inconsistent with 
academic freedom.  Here, as in so many debates concerning academic freedom, the issue 
is not only what the proper principles are, but who gets to enforce them.  As noted above, 
academic freedom is based on the institutional autonomy of universities.  The Academic 
Bill of Rights, in its purported effort to strengthen academic freedom, would in fact 
weaken if not destroy it.133  
Coming from the other direction, the AAUP’s vision of academic freedom has 
been encumbered by the addition of numerous policies, procedures, rules and prohibitions 
as an old ship accumulates barnacles.  The AAUP, of course, deserves great credit for 
having put academic freedom on the map and having investigated and reported on a 
number of important cases involving significant violations of its principles.  However, 
there is hardly any aspect of university life on which the AAUP has not expressed an 
opinion and which, according to the AAUP, is not an aspect of academic freedom.  These 
include such diverse matters as detailed procedures relating to the renewal or nonrenewal 
of appointments, dismissal and suspension, including the permissible grounds for such 
action, standards for notices of non-reappointment, the use of collegiality as a criterion for 
faculty evaluation, post-tenure review, the status of part-time faculty, non-tenure track 
appointments and the status of such faculty, the use of arbitration in cases of dismissal, 
operating guidelines for layoffs in cases of financial exigency and so on.134  This 
development is understandable as the AAUP has worked over many years to further the 
interests of faculty.  Nevertheless, to link to academic freedom every policy and procedure 
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that a professional association or labor organization might want for its members is to drain 
the concept of all meaning and to lend credence to the unfortunate view of some that 
academic freedom is no more than special pleading on behalf of a privileged elite.  
Because there are, and will continue to be, real and serious threats to academic freedom, it 
is important to all who care about universities to be clear about its meaning, to exercise 
restraint in its invocation and to support true claims with vigor. 
 
New York City 
December 2015 
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argument, repeated in Keyishian, about the “marketplace of ideas” on the ground that it is applicable to 
debate on public issues but not to the production of professional knowledge within universities where the 
authority of academic competence must be able to evaluate the quality of expert knowledge being produced 
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political control. 
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Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U.L. 791, 827 (2010). 
 
24 White, supra note 23, at 827. 
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government.  
35 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
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37 Id. at 198, 200-01. 
 
38 White, supra note 23 at 825. 
 
39 The Supreme Court has long been reluctant to recognize new privileges even when stronger First 
Amendment claims were asserted.  See, e.g., Branzburg v Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejecting claim of 
privilege by reporters for evidence that would reveal confidential sources).  Some lower courts, however, 
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125, 128-31 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v.Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1993); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 
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3:02 CV 1645 (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Miss.), or no published opinion, Koballa v. Philip Morris Co., 2007 
33334 CICI (Super. Ct., Deland Co., Fla.). 
 
41 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm’n, 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957). 
 
42 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 244-45:  “It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory 
process be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly 
sensitive areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of 
communication of ideas, particularly in the academic community.” (emphasis added)  In Dow Chemical 
Company v. Allen, 672 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1982), the Court declined to enforce a subpoena issues by Dow for 
the notes, reports, working papers and raw data of researchers at the University of Wisconsin whose 
unpublished studies caused the EPA to schedule cancellation hearings for a herbicide produced by Dow.  
The Court recognized that scholarly research “lies within the First Amendment’s protection of academic 
freedom, and therefore judicially authorized intrustion into that sphere of university life should be permitted 
only for compelling reasons.”  Id. at 1274.  The Court further stated that “to prevail over academic freedom 
the interests . . . [favoring enforcement of the subpoena] must be strong and the extent of the intrustion 
carefully limited.  Id. at 1275.  The Court concluded that this standard was not satisfied because there is little 
to justify an intrustion into university life which would risk substantially chilling the exercise of academic 
freedom.”  Id. at 1276-77.  Cf. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984), where 
the Court held that a defendant in a product liability action could subpenia some factual information from a 
cancer researcher at the University of Chicago but could not obtain “any material reflecting development of 
the researcher’s ideas or stating . . . conclusions not yet published.”  Id. at 565. 
43 See Cusamano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 
44 In one recent case, the Attorney General of Virginia, Kenneth Cuccinelli, an outspoken global warming 
skeptic, subpoenaed large numbers of documents, including computer programs, data and emails, in the 
possession of the University of Virginia related to the research of a Michael Mann, a well-known 
climatologist.  The Attorney General contended that the documents were relevant to an investigation into the 
possibility that Dr. Mann fraudulently obtained state research grants.  The University challenged the 
subpoena on the grounds that it violated principles of academic freedom and would chill research into 
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controversial subjects.  A lower court quashed the subpoena on the ground that the Attorney General had 
failed to show a sufficient reason to believe that the University possessed documents relating to Dr. Mann 
that would suggest fraud.  On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/virginia-politics/post/va-supreme-court-tosses-cuccinellis-case-
against-u-va/2012/03/02/gIQAeOqjmR_blog.html.  
 
45 In another recent case, the deputy executive director of the Wisconsin Republican Party made an open 
records request of the University of Wisconsin at Madison for the emails of Professor William Cronon, who 
had written and spoken about the right of state employees to bargain collectively.  The University withheld 
certain private email exchanges between Professor Cronon and other scholars on the ground of academic 
freedom, which the Chancellor, Biddy Martin, described in her public statement as “the freedom to pursue 
knowledge and develop lines of argument without fear of reprisal for controversial findings and without the 
premature disclosure of those ideas.” http://www.news.wisc.edu/19190.  Her statement went on to say: 
 
Scholars and scientists pursue knowledge by way of open intellectual exchange.  Without 
a zone of privacy within which to conduct and protect their work, scholars would not be 
able to produce new knowledge or make life-enhancing discoveries.  Lively, even heated 
and acrimonious debates over policy, campus and otherwise, as well as more narrowly 
defined disciplinary matters are essential elements of an intellectual environment and such 
debates are the very definition of the Wisconsin idea.   
 
When faculty members use email or any other medium to develop and share the thoughts 
with one another, they must be able to assume a right to the privacy of those exchanges, 
barring violations of state law or university policy.  Having every exchange of ideas 
subject to public exposure puts academic freedom in peril and threatens the processes by 
which knowledge is created.  The consequence for our state will be the loss of the most 
talented and creative faculty who will choose to leave for universities where collegial 
exchange and the development of ideas can be undertaken without fear of premature 
exposure or reprisal for unpopular positions. 
 
Id.  No litigation was brought challenging the withholding of these documents. 
 
46 See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Academic Freedom and the Public’s Right to Know: How to Counter the 
Chilling Effect of FOIA Requests on Scholarship, American Constitution Society Issue Brief, (September 
2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Levinson_-_ACS_FOIA_First_Amdmt_Issue_Brief_0.pdf. 
 
47 There is a tension in the 1940 Statement on this point.  On the one hand, it states that when faculty “speak 
or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline.”  On the other hand, it 
states that “their special position in the community imposes special obligations” and that “[a]s scholars and 
educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by 
their utterances” and therefore “should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should 
show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate they are not speaking for 
the institution.”  The 1940 Interpretations to the Statement do nothing to resolve this tension stating that “[i]f 
the administration of a college or university feels that a teacher has not observed the[se] admonitions . . . and 
believes that the extramural utterances of the teacher have been such as to raise grave doubts concerning the 
teacher’s fitness for his or her position, it may proceed to file charges,” but in doing so “the administration 
should remember that teachers are citizens and should be accorded the freedom of citizens.”  It then 
concludes with the following warning:  “In such cases the administration must assume full responsibility, 
and the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges are free to 
make an investigation.”  However, the 1970 Interpretive Comments go on to provide further limitations on 
the enforcement of those “admonitions,” including the following quotation from a 1964 Committee A 
Statement:  “The controlling principle is that a faculty member’s expression of opinion as a citizen cannot 
constitute grounds for dismissal unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her 
position.  Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for the position.  Moreover, a 
final decision should take into account the faculty member’s entire record as a teacher and scholar.”  AAUP, 
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POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 3, at 5-6. It thus appears that the current position of the 
AAUP is that a faculty member’s extramural utterances as a citizen should very rarely be the basis for 
disciplinary charges. 
  
48 Byrne, supra note 11, at 264.  Professor Byrne argues more generally that the meaning and purposes of 
academic freedom are distinct from those of the First Amendment, although he supports constitutional 
protection of academic freedom to the extent necessary to protect universities from political interference 
with their academic judgments.  See also William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom 
and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (1975). 
 
49 But see Cal. Educ. Code §9436, which protects students (but not faculty) at private colleges and 
universities from any rule or disciplinary sanction based solely on conduct or speech outside the campus or 
facility that would be protected from governmental restriction under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution or  Article 1 of the California Constitution.  
 
50 See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  Many of the public employee cases, like Pickering, 
involve primary or secondary school teachers.  Courts generally recognize that such schools present a 
different context from universities, if for no other reason than the age of the students.  Accordingly, in 
applying the balancing test, they generally accord greater First Amendment rights to faculty (and students) 
in university settings than in public schools.  What courts often miss, however, is the fact that only 
university faculty, and not public school teachers, enjoy academic freedom.  Accordingly, it should rarely be 
the case that speech by university faculty on matters of public concern can be seen as disruptive of the 
efficient administration of the institution.   
51 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).  The Court defined a matter of  “public concern”  as 
one  "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community."  Id. 
at 146.  This requirement reflects “the common sense realization that government offices could not function 
if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”  Id. at 143.  However, as discussed below, 
the application of this principle to concrete facts has produced widely different results. 
52 See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2009) (statements in connection with 
counseling students and student activities); Savage v. Gee, 716 F.Supp.2d 709, 718 (S.D. Ohio 2010) 
(librarian’s recommendation of book for freshman orientation); Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, 697 F.Supp.2d 367, 
378-79 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (faculty member’s complaints to union  representatives and grievance officer, 
accusations that another professor interfered in committee matters and other complaints about internal 
matters to higher-ups within department, college and university); Munn-Goins v. Bd. of T. of Bladen Cmty. 
College, 658 F.Supp.2d 713, 728 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (faculty member’s request for and distribution of salary 
information).  But see Jackson v. Leighton, 168 F.3d 903, 910 (6th Cir. 1999) (professors’ comments on 
administrative decisions regarding university resources held to be matters of public concern); Yohn v. 
Coleman, 639 F.Supp.2d 776, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (dentistry professor’s comments on alleged lowering 
of academic standards held to be a matter of public concern).    
 
53 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 438 (internal quotes omitted). 
56 Id. at 425. 
57 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014). 
 
58 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
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59 134 S, Ct. at 2379. 
 
60  Id. 
 
61 There have been a considerable number of lower court decisions applying Garcetti but only a small 
number have dealt with faculty at public universities.  For a summary of those cases, see Leonard M. 
Niehoff. Peculiar Marketplace: Applying Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Public Higher Education Context, 35 
J.C. & U.L. 75 (2008).  For a pre-Garcetti case that provides a strong endorsement of the right of a faculty 
member to speak on a controversial matter without reprisal by his college, see Levin v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
62 See, e.g., Alves v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia., ___ F.3d ___, __, Slip. Op. at 25-30 (11th Cir., 
Oct. 29, 2015) (written grievance by college counselors alleging mismanagement by their supervisor); 
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d. 402, 409-10 (9th Cir. 2014) (faculty member’s criticism of certain practices and 
policies of his school); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d at 187; Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th 
Cir. 2010 (criticism by chief of surgery at a public medical school and hospital concerning risk management, 
faculty recruitment, compensation and other administrative issues); Renkin v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 774 
(7th Cir. 2008) (dispute over research grant); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(criticism of department chair and dean); Isenalumhe, 697 F.Supp.2d at 378; Ezuma v. City Univ. of N.Y., 
665 F.Supp.2d 116, 129-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (transmittal of complaint about sexual harassment) .  Cf. Fusco 
v. Sonoma County Junior College Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 11 91431 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 
2009) (court refused to dismiss faculty member’s First Amendment claim where  complaint did not establish 
that her attempts to place certain matters on the agenda for department meetings were pursuant to her official 
duties).  Courts have generally held that speech by teachers in the K-12 context was made pursuant to their 
official duties.  See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (complaints about the handling 
of student discipline in public secondary school); Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 
345, 348-350 (6th Cir. 2010) (elementary school teacher’s complaints about work load); Lamb v. Booneville 
Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9728 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2010) (special education teacher’s complaints 
about corporal punishment). But see Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1137 
(10th Cir. 2010) (complaints of wrongdoing by speech pathologist in public school system not made 
pursuant to her duties); Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of Tipp City Exempted Village School, 428 
F.3d 223, 230 (6th Cir. 2005) (teacher comments on curricular and pedagogical decisions protected by First 
Amendment). 
  
63 See Adams v. Tr. of Univ. of North Carolina,  630 F.3d 550, 561-62 (4th Cir. 2011) (non-scholarly 
columns and articles published outside the university are protected by the First Amendment even though 
they were subsequently submitted by faculty member in support of application for promotion).  See also 
Niehoff, supra note 56, at 82-84.  This distinction creates an odd incentive for faculty members at public 
universities (and other state employees) to voice their complaints outside of the university (or chain of 
command), rather than within.  If the statements relate to a matter of public concern, the faculty are more 
likely to be protected by the First Amendment.  Furthermore, this distinction seems arbitrary in other ways.  
It suggests that faculty members are speaking pursuant to their official duties when they write an article in a 
scholarly journal or give a speech at a professional gathering, but not when they write an article in a popular 
magazine or give a speech at a political meeting.  
 
64 See, e.g., Renkin, 541 F.3d at 774; Hong, 516 F.Supp.2d at 1166. 
65 In some of these cases, the court held that the speech related to scholarship and teaching.  See Demers, 
746 F.3d at 410-13); Adams, 640 F.3d at 562-64; Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 843 (S.D. Ohio 2010); 
Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110275 at *12 (N.D Cal. Nov. 25, 2009).  In others, the court 
recognized the exception for speech relating to scholarship and classroom teaching but held it was not 
applicable.  Abcarian, 617 F.3d at 938, n. 5; Pigee v. Carl Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 
2006); Savage, 716 F. Supp.2d at 718.   
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66 Savage, 716 F.Supp.2d at 718.  In a pre-Garcetti case, one court held that faculty members had engaged in 
speech related to matters of public concern, and therefore were protected by the First Amendment, in 
connection with objects displaced in a history exhibit.  See Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679-80 (8th Cir. 
1997).  However, in a secondary school context, a court held that an art teacher’s statements to his class 
about the portfolio requirements of college art programs, including the necessity for providing sketches of 
male and female nudes, were not protected by the First Amendment.  Panse v. Eastwood, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55080 at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2007). 
 
67 Demers, 746 F. 3d at 415. 
  
68 For a thoughtful argument in favor of extending the protection of the First Amendment to faculty speech 
relating to its role in the academic governance of universities, see Areen, supra note 17, at 985-1000.  As 
that argument makes clear, however, such protection requires a careful analysis of whether or not a 
particular kind of speech relates to academic governance – a task that is far from easy.  This author believes 
that the Supreme Court is more likely to protect speech relating to such governance issues as the evaluation 
of scholarship, the revision of curriculum and the structure of academic programs by finding them within the 
exception for scholarship or teaching rather than creating a new and separate protected category for speech 
relating to academic governance.  
69 Once it is determined that the speech in question relates to a matter of public concern, it is hard to imagine 
what interest of a university could outweigh the  speaker’s interest in free expression, and there does not 
appear to be any case that has ruled against a plaintiff in this circumstance. 
 
70 In one pre-Garcetti case, a court held that there was no First Amendment protection for faculty speech in 
the classroom because it did not relate to a matter of public concern.  See Rubin v. Ikenberry, 933 F.Supp. 
1425, 1443 (C.D. Ill. 1996).  Another court reached the opposite conclusion.  See Hardy v. Jefferson 
Community College, 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001).  In Adams, 640 F.3d at 564-66, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that the speech involved a matter of public concern since the speech in question were writings and 
advocacy on clearly public issues, not the typical sort of scholarship or classroom teaching.  
 
71 See discussion at pp. 36-37 below.   
72 See, e.g., Alves, Slip op. at 30-35; Brooks v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 406 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(objections by professors to closing of their laboratories and study programs involved merely a matter of 
personal interest); Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ. Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(professor’s disagreement with processes followed in selecting president and reorganizing university did not 
involve a matter of public concern). 
 
73 In Demers, 746 F.3d at 415-17, the Ninth Circuit held that a plan for restructuring the departments of a 
school of communications addressed a matter of public concern. 
 
74 Meade v. Moraine Valley Comm. Coll., 770 F.3d 680, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2014).  The Court reasoned that 
because the content of the letter clearly related to matters of public concern, it did not matter that the writer 
may have been motivated by a personal interest or that she might benefit from any changes in policy.  See 
also Smith v. The College of the Mainland, (S.D. Tex., Oct. 30, 2014), slip op. at 5-7 (holding that speech 
concerning the ending of a policy of withdrawing union dues from employees’ paychecks involved a matter 
of public concern). 
 
75 As the Supreme Court recognized in upholding the free speech rights of students: “The college classroom 
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional 
ground in reaffirming this nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”  Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 
169, 180-81 (1972), quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
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76 See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (college violated professor’s right to free speech 
in creating alternative section of his class and investigating his conduct as a result of articles and speeches 
arguing that blacks are less intelligent than whites). 
 
77 Areen, supra note 17, at 987 n. 240. 
  
78 See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing removal of department chair 
from dismissal of tenured professor). 
 
79 It is precisely in such areas as these where universities most resemble governmental agencies and where 
the need for managerial authority to achieve effective and efficient administration becomes paramount.  See 
Areen, supra note 17, at 989; Clarke v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972); Ezuma, 665 F.Supp.2d at 
130-31. 
80 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 135-40.  Although jointly formulated by 
the three organizations, each took a different action with respect to the Statement on Government.  The 
AAUP’s Council adopted it, and the AAUP’s membership endorsed it.  The Board of Directors of the 
American Council on Education issued a statement in which it “recognizes the statement as a significant step 
forward in the clarification of the respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and administrations“ and 
“commends it to the institutions which are members of the Council.”  Similarly, the Executive Committee of 
the Association of Governing Boards issued a statement in which it “recognizes the statement as a 
significant step forward in the clarification of the respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and 
administrations,” and “commends it to the governing boards which are members of the Association.”   
 
81http://agb.org/search/node/statement%20on%20board%20responsibility%20for%20institutional%20gover
nance.  The statement was revised and updated as the AGB’s “Statement on Board Responsibility for 
Institutional Governance in 2010, to which the above citation refers.  However, the language quoted in the 
text appears in both the 1998 and 2010 statements. 
82 Areen, supra note 17, at 964-66.  For an authoritative account of the history of the role of faculty in 
governance and a thoughtful analysis of what that role should be, see William G. Bowen & Eugene M. 
Tobin, LOCUS OF AUTHORITY: THE EVOLUTION OF FACULTY ROLES IN THE GOVERNANCE 
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2015).  See also L. Bacow, N. Kopans & R. Ricker, Innovation in Teaching 
and the Freedom to Teach. Ithaka S&R, http://sr.ithaka.org/?p=24987 (Dec. 19, 2014).  For public 
universities, the authority of the board of trustees is often set by statute, and faculty rarely challenge that 
authority in court.  For two unusual examples, both at The City University of New York, where the faculty 
union and faculty senate contested the board’s authority over academic policy and lost, see Matter of 
Polishook v. City Univ. of New York, 234 AD2d 165 (1st Dept. 1996); Professional Staff Congress v. City 
Univ. of New York, 129 AD2d 472 (1st Dept. 2015).   
 
83 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
 
84 Id. at 680. 
 
85 Id. at 689. 
 
86 465 U.S. 271 (1984). 
 
87 The issue arose in an unusual context.  Minnesota law required public employees to bargain over the terms 
and conditions of employment and further required their employers to exchange views on subjects relating to 
employment that were but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining only with the exclusive representatives 
selected by the employees.  The law was challenged by faculty members at a community college who 
wanted to discuss academic matters directly with their college administration.  Although again recognizing 
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the arguments in favor of the value of faculty participation in governance, the Court held there was no 
constitutional right to do so.  Id. at 288. 
  
88 Quite apart from what is necessary for academic freedom, faculty participation in governance is an 
appropriate way to reach the best and most informed decisions, to ensure the necessary support from those 
who actually deliver the services provided by universities and to create an atmosphere conducive to the 
enthusiastic pursuit of scholarship and teaching.  These reasons also support some faculty participation in 
such “non-academic” matters as budget and facilities, where the expertise of the faculty may not always be 
relevant, and a more corporate style of governance may seem appropriate.  In addition, decisions in even 
such financial and managerial areas often have a direct and significant impact on scholarship and teaching.     
 
89 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 139 
 
90 Apart from personnel decisions, already discussed above, one example might be the content of a general 
education curriculum where it may sometimes occur that faculty judgments are affected by the desire to 
ensure an adequate number of students take courses in otherwise underutilized departments. 
 
91 Both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 Statement also justify tenure on the ground that by providing a 
degree of security, it will attract men and women of ability to the academic profession.  This is obviously a 
much weaker justification, depending as it does on a policy judgment that may or may not have empirical 
support. 
 
92 AAUP, Report on the Status of Non-Tenure Track Faculty (1993), 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/nontenuretrack.htm.  As that report makes clear, it is the AAUP’s 
position that adjunct and other non-tenure track faculty should enjoy the same right to academic freedom as 
full-time, tenure track faculty.  Although many universities accept that general position, they usually do not 
provide part-time faculty with the same procedural rights, such as a written statement of reasons for 
nonreappointment.  Those differences seem appropriate in light of the necessarily lesser degree of review 
that can realistically be given to the process of appointing or reappointing part-time faculty.  See J. Peter 
Byrne, Academic Freedom of Part-Time Faculty, 27 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2001). 
  
93 As noted above, and contrary to the inflexible language of the 1915 Declaration, it is appropriate for a 
board (or administrators) to intervene where there is evidence that that decision of the faculty was the result 
of bias, prejudice or other extraneous factors unrelated to proper academic judgment. 
 
94 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2 at 301. 
 
95 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2 at 4. 
96 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).   
97 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437 
(1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317 
(1946). 
98 See Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U. S. 551, 559 (1958). 
99 See  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78. 
100 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 544-45 (1985); Edwards, 156 F.3d at 492; 
Watkins v. McConologue, 820 F.Supp. 70, 72-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Weg v. Macchiarola, 729 F.Supp. 328, 
336 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).   
101 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). 
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102 See Loudermill, 470 U. S. at 545-46. 
103 See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997); FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988). 
104 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 11-30. 
105 Indeed, the 1958 Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings is explicit that the 
procedural standards set forth therein “are not intended to establish a norm in the same manner as the 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, but are presented rather as a guide.”  AAUP, 
POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 11.  Moreover, it is clear from a review of the 
detailed recommendations set forth in these documents that their relation to academic freedom is remote at 
best and that what the AAUP means by “academic due process” is largely a wish list of procedures favored 
by faculty, many of which are quite sensible, but about which faculty have traditionally had to make their 
case to their respective universities, whether in the context of collective bargaining or in governance 
proceedings. 
106 AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 25. 
107 Id. at 12. 
108 Byrne, supra note 11, at 262; see also Byrne, supra note 28, at 100 (“Student free speech rights against 
universities reflect political values rather than academic ones.”). 
 
109 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (State 
university, which pays for the printing expenses of other student publications, violates the First Amendment 
rights of students  in refusing to pay for the printing expenses of a student publication because it primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263 (1981) (State university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of 
registered student groups, violates First Amendment rights of students in closing its facilities to a registered 
student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.); Healy v. James, 
408 U.S. 169 (1972) (State university violates First Amendment rights of students in refusing to recognize 
student political organization because of its views.).  Students have similar, although somewhat more 
circumscribed rights in public schools.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)(Local school 
boards violate the First Amendment rights of students in removing books from library shelves solely because 
they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch.Dist., 
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (School policy violates First Amendment rights of students in prohibiting junior and 
senior high school students from wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War.).   
 
110 See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008); Bair v. Shippensburg University, 280 
F.Supp.2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Booher v.Bd. of Regents, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404 (E.D. Ky. Jul. 21, 
1998); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-85 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 
111 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 
112 Id. at 233. 
 
113 The Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, issued by the AAUP, the United States Student 
Association, the Association of American Colleges and Universities, the National Association of Student 
personnel Administrators and the National Association for Women in Education, includes the following 
provisions: 
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The professor in the classroom and in conference should encourage free discussion, 
inquiry, and expression.  Student performance should be evaluated solely on an academic 
basis, not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards. 
1. Protection of Freedom of Expression 
Students should be free to take reasoned exception to the data or views offered in any 
course of study and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion, but they are responsible 
for learning the content of any course of study for which they are enrolled. 
 
2. Protection Against Improper Academic Evaluation 
Students should have protection through orderly procedures against prejudiced or 
capricious academic evaluation.  At the same time, they are responsible for maintaining 
standards of academic performance established for each course in which they are enrolled. 
 
AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 262. 
 
114 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-21 (1972); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 
115 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 
116 Id. at 273.  
 
117 See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), where the Court upheld the refusal of a faculty committee 
to approve a master’s thesis unless the student removed the “disacknowledgements” section because it did 
not meet professional standards.  The Court applied to a university setting the principles of Hazelwood, 
holding that “the First Amendment does not require an educator to change the assignment to suit the 
student’s opinion or to approve the work of a student that, in his or her judgment, fails to meet a legitimate 
academic standard.”  Id. at 949. 
 
118 http:/www.aacu.org/about/statements/academic_freedom.cfm (internal quotes omitted).  See also Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).  In that case a Mormon student objected to certain 
language she was required to say in connection with classroom acting exercises.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case.  The Court of Appeals held that the 
Hazelwood standard requires only that restrictions on a student’s right to free expression in the classroom be 
reasonable and that courts will not override a professor’s judgment unless it is a substantial departure 
accepted academic norms or “where the proffered goal or methodology was a sham pretext for an 
impermissible ulterior motive.”  Id. at 1293.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court 
because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the department requirement that the script 
be strictly adhered to was based on legitimate pedagogical reasons or was a pretext for religious 
discrimination.  Id. at 1295. 
 
119 For a summary of the case law involving the tension between faculty and student rights, see Cheryl A. 
Cameron, Laura E. Meyers & Steven G. Olswang, Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the Classroom, 31 
J.C. & U.L. 243 (2005).  
 
120 See, e.g., Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823-24 (6th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584 
n.2 and 586 (5th Cir. 1986); Rubin, 933 F.Supp. at 1442.  
 
121 See, e.g.,Hardy, 260 F.3d at 679 (Instructor used and solicited from students derogatory expressions 
pertaining to race, sex and sexual orientation in connection with a lecture and discussion in a 
communications class about words that have historically served the interests of the dominant culture in 
violation against policy prohibiting the use of offensive language in class.); Silva v. University of New 
Hampshire, 888 F.Supp. 293, 313 (D.N.H. 1994) (Writing instructor used sexually suggestive language and 
metaphors in explaining aspects of writing in violation of sexual harassment policy.)   
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122 Consider the following example that does not involve profanity, sex, religion or other hot button issues.  
A professor’s style of questioning and criticizing students is harsh, and many of them find it difficult if not 
impossible to learn from him.  Students complain bitterly.  Those who can avoid his classes do so.  Those 
who cannot perform poorly compared to their peers in other classes.  Despite efforts to counsel him by other 
faculty and administrators, the faculty member refuses to change, arguing that his pedagogical method is 
entirely legitimate.  His department’s personnel committee eventually decides not to reappoint him.  Would 
not judicial second-guessing of that result violate the core principles of academic freedom? 
 
123 See DeJohn v. Temple University, 537 F.3d 301, 313-20 (3d Cir. 2008); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley 
College, 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996). In DeJohn the Court considered a facial challenge to a sexual 
harassment policy and found it overbroad because of the absence of the usual limitations that the harassing 
behavior must be severe and pervasive in order to create a hostile environment.  In Cohen the Court 
considered the application of a sexual harassment policy to classroom teaching that contained explicitly 
sexual topics and language. The policy in question was similar to the one in DeJohn.  The Court found it 
vague in that it did not give adequate notice that the classroom speech about which a student complained 
violated the policy.  In light of its holding on the vagueness issue, the Court declined “to define today the 
precise contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the classroom speech of college 
professors.”  Id. at 971.  The opinion contains no reference to any of the case law relating to the First 
Amendment rights of public employees.  See also Dambrot , 55 F.3d at 1182-85, where the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a First Amendment challenge to the university’s discriminatory harassment policy brought by both a 
basketball coach and students.  Nevertheless, the Court went on to hold that the termination of the coach for 
use of the word “nigger” in a locker room pep talk was permissible because his speech did not involve a 
matter of public concern and was not protected by academic freedom.  Id. at 1185-91. 
 124 “Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence”, Question L-1, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.  In an earlier guidance, OCR 
addressed a question concerning students’ objections to a writing professor’s required reading list and 
related class discussion of excerpts from literary classics that contained descriptions of explicit sexual 
conduct, including scenes that depict women in submissive and demeaning roles.  OCR opined that such 
academic discourse is protected by the First Amendment even if it is offensive to some individuals; thus, 
Title IX does not require a college to discipline a professor or censor a reading list or related class discussion 
in such circumstances.  “Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:  Harassment of Student by School 
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, Title IX”, Section XI (“First Amendment”)  (Jan. 19, 2001),  
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html. 
 
125 For example, in Hayut v. State Univ. N.Y., 352 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2003), the court found that a professor’s 
classroom comments to a female student were sufficiently offensive, severe and pervasive that a reasonable 
person could conclude that he had created a hostile environment.  The professor repeatedly called the student 
“Monica” because of a purported resemblance to Monica Lewinsky and would ask her in class about “her 
weekend with Bill” and make other sexually suggestive remarks such as “[b]e quiet Monica, I will give you 
a cigar later.”  The professor did not argue that his classroom comments were protected by academic 
freedom, and thus the court did not express a view on the availability of such a defense.  Id. at 745.  The 
AAUP, in its Report on Sexual Harassment - Suggested Policy and Procedures for Handling Complaints, 
offers the view that sexual harassment may include classroom speech that is reasonably regarded as 
offensive, substantially impairs the academic opportunity of students, is persistent and pervasive and is not 
germane to the subject matter.  AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, at 209. 
 
126 See, e.g., Yacovelli v. Moser, 2004 WL 1144183 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004) (upheld university’s 
assignment of a book about the Qu’ran in freshman orientation program); Calvary Bible Presbyterian 
Church of Seattle v. Univ. of Washington, 436 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1967) (upheld university’s course in the 
Bible as Literature).   
 
127 See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), where the court upheld restrictions on the speech 
of an assistant professor of health, physical education and recreation prohibiting him from interjecting his 
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religious beliefs and/or preferences during instructional time periods or conducting optional classes in which 
a “Christian Perspective” of an academic topic is delivered.  The Court held that the First Amendment right 
to free speech of the faculty member, which it found did not include a distinct right to academic freedom, 
was outweighed by the authority of the university to establish curriculum.  The Court declined to reach the 
Establishment Clause issue.  Although the decision does not specifically state that plaintiff’s speech was not 
related to the subject matter of the course, it would appear to underlie its reasoning; otherwise, it is hard to 
see why the general authority of the university to establish curriculum allows it to prohibit certain classroom 
speech of a faculty member consistent with the First Amendment. 
 
128 For a recent example, see the procedures established at The City University of New York,  
http://www.cuny.edu/about/administration/offices/la/PROCEDURES_FOR_HANDLING_STUDENT_CO
MPLAINTS.pdf 
 
129 See, e.g., Carley v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 153 P.2d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting claim by 
faculty member that the university violated his constitutional rights by taking into account negative student 
evaluations of his teaching in deciding not to renew his contract).   
 
130 American Historical Association, The Academic Bill of Rights, available at 
http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/abor.html. 
 
131 Similar student bills of rights have been introduced in Congress and in several state legislatures.  See 
Cameron, Meyers & Olswang, supra note 113, at 243-47.  So far none has been enacted.  
 
132 David Beito, Ralph E. Luker and Robert K. C. Johnson, The AHA’s Double Standrd on Academic 
Freedom, available at http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/issues/2006/0603/0603vie2.cfm. 
 
133 For a more detailed critique of the Academic Bill of Rights, see the Statement on the Academic Bill of 
Rights of Committee A of the AAUP, available at  http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/abor.htm. 
134 See generally AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 2, passim.  Many of the 
AAUP’s recommendations are thoughtful.  However, the connection of many such recommendations to 
academic freedom is not always clear or well established.  Moreover, where there is little or no link between 
particular AAUP policies and academic freedom, it does not seem appropriate for it to enforce them through 
investigations, reports and ultimately censure, especially at universities that established different procedures 
and policies in consultation or collective bargaining with their own faculty.   
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